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Early psychological theories of autism explained the clinical features of this
condition in terms of perceptual and sensory processing impairments.
The arrival of domain-specific social cognitive theories changed this focus,
postulating a ‘primary’ and specific psychological impairment of social
cognition. Across the years, evidence has been growing in support of
social cognitive and social attention explanations in autism. However,
there has also been evidence for general non-social cognitive impairments
in representational understanding, attention allocation and sensory
processing. Here, I review recent findings and consider the case for the speci-
ficity and primacy of the social cognitive impairment, proposing that we
should focus more explicitly on clinically valid features for insights on the
integration of ‘social’ and ‘non-social’ cognition.1. Introduction
Despite being one of the most heritable of neurodevelopmental conditions,
autism spectrum disorder continues to be defined as a behavioural syndrome
that is based on clinical information from a child’s developmental history and
current behaviour. The diagnostic criteria are diverse, spanning not only the
social domain (nonverbal communication, social reciprocity and peer relation-
ships), but also behaviours in the non-social domain (restricted, repetitive,
routinized behaviour and sensory reactions) [1]. However, there is surprisingly
little research on the nature and potential reason for this co-occurrence between
social and non-social symptoms. Instead, social cognitive research in autism in
recent decades has focused on separating out the social impairment and its
underlying cognitive or biological mechanisms. In this paper, I review recent
findings that address the issue of specificity of the social cognitive impairment
and propose that a domain-general explanation of these findings will help us to
refocus attention on clinically valid features in both social and non-social
domains.
Traditionally, theories of autism have been shaped by the pursuit of two tra-
ditional and interrelated goals. These are the goals of horizontal and vertical
integration [2]. Horizontal integration refers to the way that a disparate set of
behaviours or cognitive traits are to be understood relative to one another.
The goal of horizontal integration is often pursued by making the assumption
that certain cognitive/behavioural features are ‘primary’ or ‘core’. Other fea-
tures are explained in relation to them in a secondary capacity, either as a
downstream consequence or else as being incidentally associated and not
specific to autism. Vertical integration refers to the way in which such traits
are to be understood in terms of underlying neurobiological systems or
processes and has been viewed as a particularly important goal for neurocog-
nitive research [3,4]. The selection of primary features at the horizontal level
has fuelled the quest for vertical integration, with scientists searching for
abnormalities in brain regions or networks that underlie such core, primary
features. Hence, assumptions governing the selection of clinical and cognitive
features that are primary and specific to autism have led to the foregrounding
of particular behavioural and cognitive symptoms over others, and directed the
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Within the history of autism research, there have been chan-
ging views about what should be considered to be the
primary impairment. Kanner originally proposed in 1943 that
an affective disturbance of children with autism was the pri-
mary impairment [5]. There followed a period in which
sensory-perceptual and repetitive motor behaviour impair-
ments were considered to be key factors [6] leading to the
cognitive hypothesis by Hermelin and O’Connor in the 1970s
that children with autism have difficulty in recruiting sensory
input to make perceptual discriminations [7].
The arrival of domain-specific social cognitive theories
changed this focus, postulating a ‘primary’ impairment of cog-
nition specifically in the social domain described as a ‘theory of
mind’ [8] or ‘mentalizing’ [9] impairment. This approach
focused a growing new interest in cognitive explanations of
autism more generally [10], towards a more specific account
that targeted the core social and communication symptoms.
This approach also had appeal for the goal of vertical inte-
gration in setting out an agenda that could causally connect
diverse biological abnormalities to clinical behavioural symp-
toms by means of a simple cognitive mechanism designed
for inferring mental states [9,11]. Currently, the theory of
mind impairment still continues to be proposed as an impor-
tant cognitive mechanism that can explain some key social
communication functioning difficulties of autism [11–13].
The claims for a domain-specific cognitive impairment in
autism began with evidence from Wimmer and Perner’s false
belief task [14] which was considered the ‘litmus test’ of
theory of mind in that it aimed to test understanding about
another person’s mental representation of a situation indepen-
dently of the current situation in the real world. In this task,
children observe a scenario in which a protagonist puts an
object into location A and leaves the room. The object is then
unexpectedly moved to location B in his absence. Typical
4-year-old children correctly predict that on his return, the pro-
tagonist will look for the object where he left it, while younger
children and also childrenwith autism predict that the protago-
nist will look where the object is now. A landmark study by
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith in 1985 was the first of many
studies to show that children with autism often fail or are
extremely developmentally delayed in passing this task [15].3. A domain-specific impairment in
understanding mental representations?
Empirical evidence of false belief difficulty in children with
autism has driven forward the quest to identify the nature
and origins of this key social cognitive impairment. A crucial
question is whether the impairment in attributing false beliefs
is a domain-specific or domain-general capacity. This is differ-
ent from the question of whether false belief impairment is
specific to autism. Instead, the issue here is whether the cogni-
tive requirements of this task belong specifically to a class of
social cognitive or mentalizing processes rather than to general
high-level cognitive or lower level perceptual processes. Those
taking the domain-specific approach have argued that there is a
dedicated, innate theory of mind system with specialized
mechanisms that process mental representations about one’s
own and other people’s beliefs [8,16]. On the domain-general
side of the debate, the proposal has been that false beliefunderstanding develops gradually through the development
of general cognitive functions. For example, children develop
understanding of alternative representations of the world
[17,18] and improve in their executive control skills of cognitive
inhibition and working memory, enabling the development of
both mental state and non-mental state reasoning.
The debate between domain-specificity and domain-
generality of false belief understanding was first tested empiri-
cally by comparing false belief tasks [14] with a false
photograph task testing understanding of representation in the
non-mental domain. In contrast to poor performance on the
false belief task, childrenwith autism excelled on the false photo-
graph task [19]. However, the ‘formally identical’ nature of the
false belief and false photograph tasks [20] was challenged on
the grounds that a ‘false’ photograph is not actually ‘false’ but
an outdated and true representation of an earlier situation [21].
In contrast, the false belief is a misrepresentation of the current
reality. In order to properly test the domain specificity debate
therefore, another task was devised—the false sign task [22],
which like the false belief, misrepresents current reality. In the
standard false sign task, a scenario is enacted in which children
see a signpost that indicates an object in location A. For example,
an arrow-shaped sign indicating an ice cream van points to its
location at the village playground but then the ice cream van
is moved to location B, the church, and children are asked,
‘Where does the signpost show that the ice cream van is?’
The results of a series of studies with typically developing
children showed that performance on the false sign task
strongly correlated with performance on the false belief
task [23,24], even when age and performance on the false
photograph task was controlled. Importantly, training studies
with typically developing children aged 3–5 years also
demonstrated that learning in one false representation task
is potentially transferable to the other task [25]; by contrast,
performance on the false photo and false belief tasks are
not transferable [26]. The first study that was carried out
with children with autism used a different, but structurally
similar (false signal) task. Results showed that 10-year-old
children with autism, matched for mental age with typically
developing children, performed as poorly on this signal task
as they did for the false belief task [27]. However, given that
the false sign/signal tasks required complex language proces-
sing skills, it is possible that poor performance might be
explained by this factor. The subsequent design of a new
non-verbal false sign task, therefore, offered the opportunity
to test false sign understanding without complex language
demands or the need to inhibit where an object really is.
A non-verbal false sign task by Iao and co-workers [28]
used a non-verbal version of the false belief task [29] that had
previously shown selective impairments in children with
autism compared with children who had Specific Language
Impairment [30]. In this non-verbal false belief task, an object’s
location is hidden to the child and the child has to find the
object. In a video version of this task [31,32], an object was
placed in one of two boxes. A woman in the film saw where
it was hidden, while participants did not. The object’s location
then continued to be unknown to the participant throughout
the test trial. For the test trial, the woman then left the room
and the boxes were swapped in her absence, creating a false
belief in the woman. When she returned, she briefly placed a
marker on the box to indicate the location that she thought con-
tained the object, and removed the marker again. The
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woman’s resultant false belief to correctly locate the object in
the box that the woman had not marked.
Performance on this task [31] was compared with an
equivalent non-verbal false sign task. An electrically operated
arrow-shaped signpost was positioned on a table between
two boxes. In a brief training phase, children were familiarized
with the operation of the signpost and quickly acquired the
contingent link between the activation of the signpost direction
and the location of an object in a box. In the test phase, as in the
false belief task [32], an object was hidden in one of two boxes;
the child did not know in which box the object was hidden.
Participants could see the boxes on each side of the signpost
but the signpost was covered by a screen. The signpost
turned behind the screen towards one of the two boxes (the
participant heard the usual sound of its activation but could
not see or identify which box it turned to). The signpost was
then switched off so its direction remained fixed. The locations
of the two boxes were swapped. The screen was then briefly
removed to reveal the signpost’s direction and covered again.
In order to correctly locate the object in the box, participants
had to take into account the direction of the false sign and
the swap of the boxes. Results showed that children with
autism (verbal age 4–10 years) performed like the younger 3-
to 5-year-old typically developing children. They failed both
the false belief and false sign tasks while older 5- to 7-year-
old children typically passed both. Additional experiments
demonstrated a close correspondence between performance
on non-verbal and standard verbal versions of both tasks
[31]. Furthermore, performance on executive functioning con-
trol tasks showed that children with autism competently
grasped other cognitive demands of the task including being
able to inhibit a prepotent response and being able to use
working memory to coordinate and recall the information
components. Therefore, we argue that this evidence joins a
growing body of other evidence (for example researchmeasur-
ing understanding of identity [33,34]) which supports the case
for a domain-general difficulty. Hence understanding of belief
does ‘not develop within an isolated domain but in unison
with other domains that share needed conceptual abilities’ [33].4. A domain-specific impairment in implicit
theory of mind?
How does the evidence for a domain-general impairment in
understanding false belief, compare with recent evidence
from several studies that measure implicit false belief reason-
ing? The two-system interpretation of theory of mind
described by Apperly & Butterfill [35,36] provides a distinc-
tion between fast, automatic implicit processes and later
developing, slower and more effortful explicit cognitive pro-
cesses. Evidence of children’s anticipatory looking behaviour
during false belief tasks has been used to make the proposal
that even typically developing infants can correctly ascribe
implicit false belief even though they cannot give correct
answers to direct questions in standard false belief tasks. By
contrast, individuals with autism consistently have difficulty
even on implicit false belief tasks.
In a series of implicit false belief studies, Senju and col-
leagues used an anticipatory looking paradigm [37], with
individuals who had autism including adults [38], children
aged 6–8 years (verbal age 3–12) [39] and 3-year-old siblingsat risk of autism and other conditions [40]. In the Southgate–
Senju task, participants watched a video in which a puppet
placed the ball in one of two boxes, overseen by an actor.
However, when a phone rang behind her, the actor turned
behind and, while her back was turned, the puppet trans-
ferred the ball to a second box, then removed it, and then
disappeared altogether. Participants were then presented
with an audio-visual cue. They had previously learned in a
familiarization trial that this cued a window to open and
the actor to reach her hand through the window to retrieve
the object. Results showed that even before the window
opened, the typically developing 2-year-olds made correct
anticipatory looks to the window above the box where the
woman last saw it, even though in reality there was no
object in either box; individuals with autism showed no
bias for looking towards either box.
How should we compare the poor performance of individ-
uals with autism on the Southgate–Senju task and the equally
poor performance on the non-verbal false representation (false
belief and false sign) tasks described above? Different expla-
nations seem to be required. Although all these tasks were
non-verbal and were designed to control for difficulties in
language and executive functioning demands, if we follow
the interpretation of the two-system account above, only the
Southgate–Senju task qualifies as a candidate for implicit
theory of mind (fast, automatic) while the other tasks would
count as explicit (slow, effortful) tasks. In support of this con-
clusion, a series of anticipatory looking and explicit reasoning
studies carried out by Low [41] with typically developing chil-
dren showed that while implicit knowledge (anticipatory
looking) was related to explicit reasoning, the capacity to
pass explicit false-belief tasks was exclusively related to other
skills such as higher order cognitive flexibility, representational
understanding and complex language processing.
The results of ‘implicit’ theory ofmind studies thenmay lead
us to an assumption that individuals with autism have a pro-
blem with attributing belief spontaneously, in a rapidly
changing social situation [12]. However, a major criticism of
the Southgate–Senju task is that it does not actually provide evi-
dence of the attribution of false belief in typical children [42].Nor
does the task necessitate the attribution of more simple mental
states such as ‘know’ or even ‘see’ [42,43]. Instead it is possible
to use anticipatory looking to ‘pass’ this task, by means of ‘be-
haviour rules’. These behaviour rules include keeping track of
the direction in which agents look and forming an ‘experiential
record’ of how agents behave [44]. One interpretation of the
Southgate–Senju results therefore could be that individuals
with autism had difficulty in tracking an agent’s looking behav-
iour to different locations. By contrast, typically developing
infantswere able to quickly track the actor’s head direction (indi-
cated by the angle of the peak of the actor’s visor). By tracking
this association between left/right head direction and linking
it to object location in the test trials, the typically developing
child could consolidate a learned association already established
in the four previous familiarization trials.
Nevertheless, even though this task does not provide evi-
dence of attribution of ‘false belief’ or any other mental state
for that matter, one might argue that the capacity to pass the
task by tracking social cues highlights the potential power of
social attention for typically developing children and the
absence of this capacity for children with autism. Interest-
ingly, however, the Southgate–Senju eye-tracking data do
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actor is looking. Results showed that although participants
with autism did show less spontaneous gaze checking of
the actor’s face, when this was statistically controlled for in
the analysis, the group difference in anticipatory looking
towards the correct box still remained [38,39]. Several other
interpretations are possible for the pattern of performance.
One possibility that I expand on below is that the individuals
with autism had difficulty spontaneously allocating attention
to the box when the connecting link between social cue and
target object was disrupted. Another proposal made by
Heyes [43] is of memory interference as children were dis-
tracted by the telephone ringing and head turning and
failed to encode or recall the object’s last location. The typi-
cally developing children resorted to looking to the location
where they themselves had last seen the object and individ-
uals with autism responded randomly with no reliable
basis for predicting which window to look towards.
Heyes argues further that the bias to track human direc-
tional movement does not need to rely on a domain-specific
social mechanism; non-social directional cues such as arrows
also capture and direct attention to the same extent as heads
and eyes [45]. When tasks are designed to test implicit
theory of mind (in this case, the mental state of ‘seeing’) by
including control tasks such as a directional arrow cue or a
non-human agent, no differences between social and non-
social conditions are found. Typically developing adults [46]
and even adults with autism [47] perform similarly in both
the conditions. To date, however, direct tests of the domain-
specific hypothesis of implicit mental states understanding
(e.g. belief, seeing and knowing) are few and have been con-
fined to able adults. Meanwhile the domain-specific view
has been generally accepted, particularly in the form of the
impaired social attention hypothesis of autism. I review evi-
dence for the social attention hypothesis below, before
returning to domain-general approaches to autism.5. An impairment in social attention?
So far, I have made the case that understanding of ‘explicit’
representational false belief involves an appreciation of the
relationship between a representation and what it represents
[17] and argued that false belief difficulty in children with
autism reflects a domain-general impairment that applies to
both mental and non-mental representations [31]. I have
also supported the ‘lean’ interpretation [42,44] that correct
anticipatory looking during ‘implicit’ false belief tasks does
not provide evidence of ability to attribute beliefs or possibly
any other mental state. Instead, the lack of correct anticipatory
looking in these tasks might be explained by an inability to
keep track of others’ behaviour. This might be because of a
lack of social attention or possibly because of a domain-general
impairment that is not specific to social stimuli.
While domain-specific explanations propose innate,
maturational, mechanisms that are specialized for handling
mental representations [8,16,48], social attention accounts pro-
pose that reduced social attentional biases lead to reduced
opportunities for experiential learning. These accounts have
focused on ‘low-level’, bottom-up social cognitive processes,
and their arrival has corresponded with a move towards
more social constructivist and social cultural explanations of
autism. Taken together, social attention accounts propose thatchildren with autism fail to preferential orient to people due
to impairment in the developing social brain network respon-
sible for the processing of faces, human voices and biological
motion, and impaired social reward preferences [49–51]. The
resultant impoverishment in social information input, lack of
social experience and reward from social engagement and
lack of coordinated joint attention activities with others then
has a cascading or downstream effect that compromises the
development of cognitions such as theory of mind [52–54].
Although evidence for social orienting impairments in
infants and in older children and adults has been extensively
cited, it is important to remember that poor social gaze to
faces, social initiation and lack of gaze following and pointing
are already common clinical symptoms of autism by the time
of diagnosis at 2–3 years, helping to assign children to the
grouping of autism. If the goal is to provide an underlying
explanation for these symptoms, it is important to avoid
the circularity in simply re-describing them. One approach
that helps to reduce this circularity is a longitudinal
approach, which aims to identify social-specific behavioural
or neural markers in the first year of life as independent
predictors of diagnostic symptoms before these diagnostic
symptoms actually appear. Another approach is to use exper-
imental tasks that include both social and non-social stimuli.
Surprisingly, longitudinal findings taken from a range of
measures of social orienting and social reward indicate very
few differences between at-risk infants who are later diagnosed
with autism, and typically developing infants in the first year
of life. A recent review reported that basic aspects of orienting
and reward (e.g. scanning of faces, preference to look at the
eyes, response to still face) are intact in at-risk infants when
they are six to nine months old [55] and even as young as
two months [56], contradicting claims of an innate social
orienting or theory of mind impairment from birth. Evidence
from event-related potentials (ERP), at six to nine months
old, do indicate failure to distinguish gaze direction [57], a
result that is not replicated in terms of impaired behavioural
gaze-following however until after 12monthswhen infants fol-
lowed gaze but looked less to the gazed-at object. As the
control tasks in these ERP studies did not include non-social
directional cues it is not clear if the earlier difficulty reflected
a general or specific response to a directional cue.
The limited range of evidence supporting both social and
non-social impairments makes it difficult to draw strong con-
clusions. The findings above do not show that there is early
social attention impairment in the first year of life in children
who are later diagnosed with autism. This indicates that the
domain-specific social attention account of innate social orient-
ing or early learning in the first year is unlikely to be supported
[58]. Other longitudinal evidence taken from typically develop-
ing children does show that anticipatory looking (‘implicit
theory of mind’) at 18 months predicts false belief reasoning
at 48 months [59]. However, even these findings may also
need not necessarily indicate conceptual continuity. Awareness
of ‘behaviour rules’ in infancy that someonewill lookwhere an
object is last seen may be useful for building the reconceptua-
lization at an older age that someone will think an object is
where he or she last saw it and will look where he or she
thinks it is. However, in tasks involving locations, it may be
that it is possible to also draw information from domain-
general direction cues as described above. This is indicated
by the finding that significant longitudinal relationships
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tasks and not for the contents-identity false belief tasks [59].
Experiments with older children and adults have used
structured Posner-type gaze-cueing paradigms, in which a
central face cue looks left or right followed by a peripheral
target stimulus appearing to the left or right. Social-specific
impairments have not been found for the autism group
where non-social arrow cues provide a control condition
[60,61]. However, autism participants tend to respond more
slowly in both conditions than ability matched control
groups. These and other studies (e.g. [62]) reveal that the
gaze-following capacity itself is not missing. Many individuals
with autism follow gaze, especially when an instruction is
given. By pre-school age, they can make fine discriminations
based on the angle of the other person’s eyes [63], yet tend
not to spontaneously follow gaze unless given an explicit
verbal or sensory cue [64] and have difficulty particularly at
low developmental ages and when there is no visible target
to ‘anchor’ their gaze [65]. Such reliance on predictable cue-
target links might indicate difficulty in the spontaneous
initiation and allocation of attention.
Evidence of atypicality in attention allocation can be seen
in free-viewing tasks even with adults, for example in the
vanishing-ball illusion. In this task, a magician throws a
ball into the air twice. His social cues misdirect one’s expec-
tations and attention so that when he makes a third throw,
this time a fake throw, we ‘see’ a ball vanish in the air. Eye-
tracking findings in adults with autism viewing this illusion
[66] showed that contrary to the predictions of the specific
social attention hypothesis, they followed social cues and
had typical patterns of fixation when looking at the magi-
cian’s face and eyes. However, they were slower to launch
their first eye movement to the face and had difficulty in fix-
ating the fast-moving ball that he was looking at. Several
other studies using either eye-tracking measures or electro-
dermal measures of non-social stimuli [67,68] have reported
delay in responses to the first presented stimulus. These
results are consistent with results from Senju’s [38] adult find-
ings for the ‘implicit’ false belief task of a group difference in
first eye fixation, but the findings here suggest a more
domain-general difficulty that is not specific to social stimuli.
Atypicality in sensory-perceptual and attentional proces-
sing is not only evident in adults, it is also evident in infants.
Longitudinal findings of at-risk infant siblings in the first
year of life who develop autism, show reduced visual fixation
durations in spontaneous looking to a range of object stimuli at
six to nine months old, indicating atypical attentional deploy-
ment at a very early age [69]. Other studies show enhanced
visual search ability at nine months in the detection of target
items from an array of distracters [70]. By contrast to this
superior visual search, slowed disengagement of attention
has also been found in 7- to 14-month-olds [53] although at
least five studies have not reported atypical disengagement
in older children [71]. A critical factor affecting disengagement
performance is likely to be the stimulus presented [72].
Dynamic moving stimuli of abstract form and strong colour
and that have high stimulus interest value to the participant
will increase the slowing of disengagement [73].
Recent domain-general approaches focus on atypical per-
ception, attention, sensory modulation and arousal [74,75]
and aim to explain both diminished [76] and enhanced [75]
abilities in individuals with autism at low and high levels
of processing. For example, reduced multisensory facilitation[77] and difficulties with competing information processing
demands may help explain not only performance on particu-
lar visuo-spatial tasks but also on high-level reasoning tasks
(e.g. false belief tasks).
Sensory symptoms across all modalities are highly preva-
lent in autism [78] and delays in the allocation of attention
may be exacerbated particularly when deviant or novel stimuli
appear or in the presence of a strongly interfering stimulation
[74]. Even after attention has been allocated to a particular
stimulus, individuals with autism may have difficulty with
modulating their attention, particularly when stimuli are com-
plex and changing [79]. Understanding these kinds of
difficulties is central to our understanding of clinical features
of repetitive behaviour as well as to social-communication
problems. Hermelin and O’Connor originally proposed that
children with autism have difficulties in recruiting sensory
input to make perceptual discriminations unless these are
based on their own motor feedback [7]. New research aimed
at measuring neural correlates of sensory [80,81] and also
motor difficulties [82] may help to revive this account and
develop an explanatory approach that connects sensory,
motor and social/emotional clinical features.6. Conclusion: what are we trying to explain?
Despite theoretical changes in the study of autism in the last
few decades, the goals of horizontal and vertical integration
continue to be pursued. Primary symptoms are still elevated
above secondary symptoms and ‘core’ underlying biological
mechanisms are still sought to explain these primary symp-
toms. These assumptions are part and parcel of the way
that causal models have traditionally been formulated for
developmental disorders, but in the new movement away
from domain-specific, localized and innate explanations, I
propose that we avoid the temptation to swing completely
back in time to an exclusive focus on the sensory-repetitive
clinical symptoms and non-social cognitive processing as
primary symptoms.
Instead I suggest that we loosen the goal of horizontal
integration beyond the grip of primary impairments, and
consider other forms of integration that link across different
types of social impairment and across social and non-social
symptoms. Atypical behaviours in the social domain include
difficulty in quite different sub-type areas of social function-
ing. These include non-verbal communication, conformity to
social conventions, sharing and empathic relationships, and
atypical social approach, e.g. aloof, passive or one-sided
styles of interaction. How should these social sub-types be
understood in relation to each other outside of a domain-
specific explanatory framework? Furthermore, atypical
behaviours in the social domain must, by necessity, co-
occur with restricted and sensory features in order that any
autism diagnosis can be given. How do different subtypes
of social functioning interact with different subtypes of
restricted and sensory functioning not only at behavioural
but also cognitive and neural levels of description? Research
has not yet scratched the surface of this question although
some researchers are beginning to move in this direction by
dissecting features within the social domain that cross several
neurodevelopmental or psychiatric disorders [83]. Further
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autism in a domain-general context.
New ways of thinking about the goal of horizontal inte-
gration will lead to new ways of thinking about the goal of
vertical integration. Neurocognitive models are now emerging
that conceptualize alternative developmental pathways linking
domain-general synaptic function to social and non-social
autism symptoms [55] and incorporating heterogeneity at
both neural and behavioural levels [75]. Developmental
change is central to these models. Longitudinal evidence will
be important in highlighting cases where there are early
signs of sensory-perceptual and domain-general cognitive
processing difficulties that do not develop into a clear-cut
clinical presentation of autism. It has long been argued that
developmental outcomes may not be determined by anyparticular critical underlying impairment [84] but instead
that elements within causal relationships are co-actional, with
factors having a dynamic impact on each other across time
[85]. Therefore, we should retain a focus on the full range of
clinically valid features of autism for insights on the integration
of ‘social’ and ‘non-social’ cognition across development. Such
insights are important not only for thosewho develop a clinical
diagnosis of autism but also for those who do not.Competing interests. I declare I have no competing interests.
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